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Introduction
This paper develops a framework in which market structure is determined by the intermediation service offered to customers. We consider two representative business modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets. In one mode, an intermediary acts as a middleman (or a merchant), who is specialized in buying and selling for his own account and typically operates with inventory holdings (e.g. supermarkets, traditional brick and mortar retailers, and dealers in financial and steal markets). In the other mode, an intermediary acts as a marketmaker, who offers a marketplace or a platform for fees, where the participating buyers and sellers can search and trade with each other (e.g. auction site or brokers in goods and financial markets, and many real estate agencies).
In many real-life markets, however, intermediaries are not one of those extremes but operate both as a middleman and a marketmaker at the same time. This is what we call a marketmaking middleman. For example, the electronic intermediary Amazon, one of the largest marketmaking middlemen nowadays, started off as a pure middleman, who buys and resells products in its own name since the foundation in 1994. In the early 2000s, Amazon started to also act a marketmaker, by allowing other suppliers to participate in their marketplace (or platform) as independent sellers.
In 2014, the products offered in the platform accounted for around 50% of the Amazon's total merchandise volume.
A similar pattern is observed in financial markets. Since 2006, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has adopted a new hybrid trading system featuring an expanded platform sector, the "NYSE Arca", which allows investors to choose whether to trade electronically or to use traditional floor brokers and specialists (who offer trading opportunities to investors as well as take market positions with their own account). 1 The new system is further supplemented by several dark pools owned by NYSE. These strategies are also adopted by NASDAQ which has been thought of as a typical dealers' market.
Finally, while intermediaries in housing markets are mostly seen as brokers, i.e. platforms, some successful real-estate agencies often employ the same business mode as in Amazon.com or NYSE Arca. For instance, the Trump Organization (owned by Donald J. Trump and his family) 1 In the finance literature, the following terminologies are used to classify intermediaries: brokers refer to intermediaries who do not trade for their own account, but act merely as conduits for customer orders, akin to our marketmakers; dealers refer to intermediaries who do trade for their own account, akin to our middlemen/merchants. The marketmakers (or specialists) in financial markets quote prices to buy or sell assets as well as take market positions, so they may correspond broadly to our market-making middlemen.
holds several hundred thousand square feet of prime Manhattan real estate in New York City and some more in other big cities. Besides developing and owning residential real estate, the Trump family operates a brokerage company that deals with luxury apartments, the Trump International Realty. Indeed, the Trump's business mode is a marketmaking middleman -both owning his own residential towers, and offering broker services. According to Forbes, the latter portion of Trump's empire becomes by far his largest business with a valuation of $562 million in 2006.
In this paper, we aim at understanding the occurrence and the functioning of these intermediated markets. For this purpose, we consider a model in which the intermediated-market structure is determined endogenously as a result of the strategic choice of a monopolistic intermediary. In our model, there are two markets open to agents, one is an intermediated market operated by the intermediary, and the other is a decentralized market where buyers and sellers search individually.
The intermediated market combines two business modes: as a middleman, the intermediary is prepared to serve many buyers at a time by holding inventories; as a marketmaker, the intermediary offers a platform and receives fees. The intermediary can choose how to allocate the attending buyers among these two business modes.
We formulate the intermediated market as a directed search market in order to feature the intermediary's technology of spreading price and capacity information efficiently -using the search function offered in the NYSE Arca or Amazon website or in the web-based platform for house hunters, for example, one can receive instantly all relevant information such as prices and stocks of individual sellers. In addition, this approach enables us to highlight the middleman's advantage in high selling capacity that mitigates search frictions and provides customers with proximity. The decentralized market represents an individuals' outside option that determines the lower bound of their market utility.
limited production of sellers and frictions in the wholesale market, which increases the profitability of using an active platform even with single-market search. However, these extensions do not alter our main insight on the emergence of marketmaking middleman. This paper is related to two strands of literature. One is the literature of middlemen developed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) This mechanism is adopted by the middleman in our model. Hence, if intermediation fees were not available, then our model would be a simplified version of Watanabe where we added an outside market. It is worth mentioning that in Watanabe (2010 Watanabe ( , 2013 , the middleman's inventory is modeled as a discrete unit, i.e., a positive integer, so that the middlemen face a non-degenerate distribution of their selling units as other sellers do. In contrast, here we model the inventory as a mass, assuming more flexible inventory technologies, so that the middleman faces a degenerate distribution of sales. This simplification allows us to characterize the middleman's profit-maximizing choice of inventory holdings -in Watanabe (2010) the inventory level of middlemen is determined by aggregate demand-supply balancing, and in Watanabe (2013) it is treated as an exogenous parameter. More recently, Holzner and Watanabe (2016) study a labor market equilibrium using a directed search approach to model a job-brokering service offered by Public Employment
Agencies, but the choice of intermediation mode is not the scope of their paper.
The other related strand is the two-sided market literature, e.g. Rochet . 3 The critical feature of a platform is the presence of the cross-group externality, i.e. the participants' expected gains from a platform depend positively on the number of participants on the other side of it. When such a cross-group externality exists, the marketmaker can use "divide-and-conquer" strategies, namely, subsidizing one group of participants in order to attract another group and extract the ensuing externality benefit (see, Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) . A similar strategy is adopted by the intermediary in our model. Broadly speaking, if there were no middleman mode, then our model would be a directed search version of Caillaud and Jullien (2003) in combination with a decentralized market.
Finally, Rust and Hall (2003) consider two types of intermediaries, one is "middlemen" whose market requires costly search and the other is a monopolistic "market maker" who offers a frictionless market. They show that agents segment into different markets depending on heterogeneous production costs and consumption values, thus these two types of intermediaries can coexist in equilibrium. Their model is very different from ours in many respects. For instance, selling capability and inventory do not play any role in their formulation of search rule, but it is the key ingredient in our model. 4 Further, we show that a monopolistic intermediary can pursue different types of intermediation modes even faced with homogeneous agents.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup. Section 3 studies the choice of intermediation mode for single-market technologies that serves as a benchmark of our economy. Section 4 extends the analysis to allow for multiple-market technologies and gives the key finding of the paper. Section 5 discusses modeling issues. Section 6 discusses the real-life applications of our theory. Section 7 concludes. Omitted proofs are in the Appendix. Finally, an
Additional Appendix contains our extension to allow for unobservable capacity and participation fees.
emphasizing matching heterogeneity, see e.g., Block and Ryder (2000), Damiano and Li (2007) and De Fraja and Sákovics (2012). 4 Rust and Hall (2003) say: "An important function of intermediaries is to hold inventory to provide a buffer stock that offers their customers liquidity at times when there is an imbalance between supply and demand. In the securities business, liquidity means being able to buy or sell a reasonable quantity of shares on short notice. In the steel market, liquidity is also associated with a demand for immediacy so that a customer can be guaranteed of receiving shipment of an order within a few days of placement. Lacking inventories and stockouts, this model cannot be used to analyze the important role of intermediaries in providing liquidity (page 401)." 5 In the matketing literature, without considering search frictions, Hagiu and Wright (2015) study the profitability of intermediation modes as is determined by marketing activities. In their model, it is assumed that the owner of a product has private information on how effective their marketing activity will be. They show that the profit maximizing design of intermediation mode is determined, among others, by the cross-product spillovers of marketing activity, and the degree of owners' informational advantage. For each product, an intermediary only takes the preferred extreme mode instead of a hybrid one, and their theory explains which products the intermediary should offer in which mode. In contrast, by considering search frictions, we show that even for a homogeneous product, a hybrid intermediation mode can occur in equilibrium. Our theory explains how the intermediated market is structured depending on the search/competitive environment. 6 
Setup
We consider a large economy with two types of agents: a mass B of buyers and a mass S of sellers. Agents of each type are homogeneous. Each buyer has unit demand of a homogeneous good, and each seller has a production technology of that good. The consumption value for the buyer is normalized to 1. The marginal production cost is constant and without loss of generality, we normalize it to zero to simplify our presentation in the first section. Sellers are able to produce as much as they want but their selling/trading capability is limited so that each seller can serve only one buyer.
There are two retail markets, a centralized market and a decentralized market (see Figure   1 ). The decentralized market (hereafter D market) is featured by random matching and bilateral bargaining. We assume that the flow of contacts between sellers and buyers in the D market is 
and a seller finds a buyer with probability
constant. This linear matching technology is extended to general non-linear matching functions in Section 6. Matched partners follow an efficient bargaining process, which yields a linear sharing of the total surplus, with β ∈ (0, 1) the share for the buyer, and 1 − β the share for the seller.
The centralized market (hereafter C market) is operated by a monopolistic intermediary. The intermediary can perform two different intermediation activities. As a middleman, he purchases a good from sellers in a wholesale market, and resells it to buyers. The wholesale market is operated by sellers, who have no limit in producing the good. We assume the wholesale market to be competitive so that the demand of the middleman is always satisfied at the competitive wholesale-price equal to marginal production cost (normalized to zero). We will describe later the case with a positive wholesale price. The middleman can stock the good in advance so that he is prepared to serve buyers on the retail markets. As a market-maker, he does not buy and sell but instead provides a platform where buyers and sellers can interact with each other for trade upon paying fees.
We assume that the C market is subject to coordination frictions. In a directed search environment, the prices and capacities of all the individual suppliers are publicly observable. The , and in this sense, the platform in our economy is frictional. As will be detailed below, however, there is no such friction in the middleman's trade since its inventory management technologies allow for the selling capability to be comparable to the population of potential buyers in magnitude.
The timing of events is as follows. 3. In the C market, the participating buyers, sellers and middleman are engaged in a directed search game. In the D market, agents search randomly and follow the efficient sharing rule for the trade surplus.
We first derive a directed search equilibrium in the C market. Suppose that a mass of B buyers and a mass ofS ∈ {0, S} sellers have decided to participate in the C market. The C market has the following stages. In the first stage, all the suppliers, i.e., the participating sellers (ifS = S)
with the unit selling-capacity and the middleman with capacity K, simultaneously post a price which they are willing to sell at. 
which states that the number of buyers visiting individual sellersSx s and the middleman x m should sum up to the total population of participating buyers B. The second requirement is that buyers search optimally:
where V i (x i ) is the equilibrium value of buyers in the C market to visit a seller if i = s and the middleman if i = m (yet to be specified below). Combining (1) and (2) gives the counterpart for
As for the intermediation mode in the C market, we shall adopt the following terminology.
Definition 1 Suppose B buyers andS ∈ {0, S} sellers participate in the C market. Then, given the equilibrium search conditions (1) and (2), we say that the intermediary acts as:
• a pure middleman if x m = B;
• a market-making middleman if x m ∈ (0, B);
• a pure market-maker if x m = 0.
3 Single-market search 
The middleman sets p m = 1 − λ b β.
Note that as each retail-market is faced with two-sided participation, an issue arises for the belief-dependent multiplicity of equilibria -the participation decision of buyers (sellers) depends on their belief on the participation of sellers (buyers). For the selection of beliefs, the literature of two-sided markets assumes that agents hold pessimistic beliefs on the participation decision of agents on the other side of the C market (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) . In our setup, the middleman's capacity advantage reveals that supply K is available in the C market, irrespective of the number of sellers participating. Hence, the intermediary can induce buyers' participation under those beliefs, as long as condition (3) is satisfied. 
while the expected value of a buyer who visits the seller is
In the presence of the platform, the middleman sector is described as follows. Suppose a middleman sets a price p ≤ 1 − λ b β and has an expected queue x = B − Sx s of buyers. Then, since the middleman has a mass of capacity, the expected profit from the middleman sector is given by min{K, x}p. The expected value of buyers visiting the middleman is
In any active platform, it must hold that V s (x s ) ≥ λ b β and p s ≥ f s . These conditions imply
Then, the expected profits of the active platformS = S satisfy
Hence, opening the platform is not profitable.
The intuition behind the occurrence of a pure middleman is as follows. Given the frictions on the platform, a larger middleman sector creates more transactions. To achieve the highest possible number of transactions, the intermediary shuts down the platform. In a nutshell, the middleman's capacity is the best way to distribute the good and, if agents search within a single market, the intermediary is guaranteed with the highest possible surplus of it. The allocation characterized here serves as a benchmark for our economy.
Proposition 1 (Pure middleman) Given single-market search technologies, the intermediary
will not open the platform and will act as a pure middleman with x m = K = B, serving all buyers for sure.
Multi-market search
In this section, we extend our analysis to multiple-market search technologies where agents can search in both the C market and the D market. A timing issue arises on which market should open first. Below, we present the analysis of the setup that the C market opens prior to the D market. Apart from the fact that this appears to be the most natural setup in our economy, we are motivated by the first mover advantage of the intermediary: its expected profit is higher if the C market opens before, rather than after, the D market. Hence, our setup will arise endogenously if the intermediary is allowed to select the timing of the market sequence. 8 In this section, we consider explicitly constant production costs c ∈ (0, 1) in order to guarantee the capacity choice not to be indeterminant.
C market and outside options
We work backward and first describe the directed search equilibrium of the C market. As before, any directed search equilibrium in the C market has to satisfy (1) and (2) . Given the multiplemarket search technology, what is new here is that agents expect a non-negative value for the D market when deciding whether or not to accept an offer in the C market. Whenever the platform is active x s > 0 (andS = S), it must satisfy the incentive constraints:
The constraint of buyers (4) states that the offered price/fee in the platform is acceptable only if the offered payoff, 1 − p s − f b , is no less than the expected value in the D market: the outside payoff is β(1−c) if the buyer is matched with a seller who has failed to trade in the C market. This happens with probability
s . Hence, the larger the platform size x s , the higher the chance that a seller trades in the C market, and the lower the chance that a buyer can trade successfully in the D market and the lower his expected outside payoff.
In the above formulation, all agents are supposed to stay in the D market so that some meetings are successful and others are not. This opens up the interaction between the C market and the D market. With non-linear matching functions, this assumption can be dispensed. We will clarify this point in Section 6.
The constraint of sellers (5) states that the payoff in the C market p s − f s − c should be no less than the expected payoff in the D market. This depends on a seller's chance of engaging in a trade in the D market λ s ξ (x m , K), where ξ (x m , K) represents the probability that a buyers has failed to trade in the C market and is given by
The buyer visits the middleman sector with probability
B and is served with probability min
or he visits the platform with probability Hence, in the above expression, the second term represents the expected chance of the buyer to trade in the C market.
We have a similar condition of buyers for the middleman sector:
where the middleman's price must be acceptable for buyers relative to the expected payoff in the D market.
Given the outside option of the D market, the equilibrium value of buyers in the C market is
for an active platform x s > 0 and
for an active middleman sector x m > 0. Here, if a buyer visits a seller (or a middleman), then he gets served with probability η s (x s ) (or η m (x m )) and his payoff is 1
not served in the C market, then he enters the D market and he can find an available seller with 13 probability
s . Similarly, the equilibrium value of active sellers in the platform is given by
A seller trades successfully in the C market platform with probability x s η s (x s ) and receives
If not successful, then he enters the D market and he can meet an available buyer with probability λ s ξ (x m , K).
Intermediation Mode
Our next step is to determine the profit of each intermediation mode, denoted byΠ(x m ). (6), and unit cost (or wholesale price) c, and makes profits
Active platform: In an active platform (x s > 0 andS = S), we now need to determine the equilibrium price p s . We follow the standard procedure in the directed search literature. Suppose a seller deviates to a price p = p s that attracts an expected queue x = x s of buyers. Note that given the limited selling-capacity, this deviation has measure zero and does not affect the expected utility in the C market, V . Since buyers must be indifferent between visiting any seller (including the deviating seller), the equilibrium market-utility should satisfy
where
is the probability that a buyer is served by this deviating seller. If not served, which occurs with probability 1 − η s (x), his expected utility in the D market is
Given market utility V , (11) determines the relationship between x and p, which we denote by x = x (p|V ). This yields a downward sloping demand faced by the seller: when the seller raises his price p, the queue length of buyers x becomes smaller, and vice versa.
Given the search behavior of buyers described above and the market utility V , the seller's optimal price should satisfy
Substituting out p using (11), the sellers' objective function can be written as
where x = x (p|V ) satisfies (11) and
is the intermediated trade surplus, i.e., the total trading surplus in the C market net of the outside options. Since choosing a price is isomorphic to choosing a queue, the first order condition is
The second order condition can be easily verified. Arranging the first order condition using (11) and evaluating it at x s = x (p s |V ), we obtain the equilibrium price p s = p s (V ) which can be written as
For the platform to be active, the price and fees must satisfy the incentive constraints (4) and (5) . Substituting in (12) yields
which states that for the platform to be active x s > 0, the total transaction fee f should not be greater than the intermediated trade surplus, v (x m , K). Whenever (4) and (5) are satisfied, (13) must hold, and whenever (13) is satisfied, (4) and (5) must hold. Hence, we can say that the market maker faces the constraint (13) for an active platform.
Observe that for K < x m , we have
which is decreasing in x m . This occurs because a larger sized platform (i.e., a lower x m ) crowds out the D market transactions and lowers the outside value. Similarly, we have the following result.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, with multiple-market search, an active platform can enlarge the intermediation surplus.
Pure market-maker: When the middleman sector is not open, x s = B S . Given the equilibrium price p s in the platform in (12) , the intermediary charges a fee f = f b + f s in order to maximize
f, subject to the constraint (13) . The constraint is binding and it yields:
The profit of the market-maker mode is
Market-making middleman: If the intermediary is a market-making middleman, then x m ∈ (0, B) and
. Applying (7), (8), and (12) 
Together with (1), this equation defines the relationship between p m and x m . Applying this expression, we can see that the condition (6) is eventually reduced to (13) . The profit of the marketmaking middleman mode is
subject to (13) and x m ∈ (0, B). Note that K > x m cannot be profitable since it is a mere increase in capacity costs. The profit maximization requires the following properties.
Lemma 2 The market-making middleman sets:
The intermediary's capacity should satisfy all the forthcoming demands, and the intermediation fee should be set to extract the full intermediation surplus.
Profit-maximizing intermediation mode: To derive a profit-maximizing intermediation mode, it is important to observe that relative to the pure middleman mode, there are two benefits of using an active platform with multiple-market search. First, as shown in Lemma 1, an active platform can enlarge the intermediation surplus. Second, with v(·) = f , the incentive constraint (6) is binding, and the middleman's equilibrium price is given by
for any x s ≥ 0 (see (15) ). This shows that p m decreases with x m : the outside value of buyers depends positively on the size of the middleman sector, since a larger scale of middleman crowds out the platform and increases the chance that a buyer can find an active seller in the D market (who was unsuccessful in the platform). Hence, to extend the size of the middleman sector, the intermediary has to lower the price p m . In other words, a larger platform allows for a price increase by reducing agents' outside trade opportunities.
Proposition 2 (Market-making middleman/Pure Market-maker) Given multi-market search technologies, there exists a unique directed search equilibrium with active intermediation. The intermediary will open a platform and act as:
• a pure market-maker if λ b β > Proof. See the Appendix.
With multiple-market search technologies, there is a cross-market feedback from the D market to the C market. That is, due to the two benefits mentioned above, using the platform as part or all of its intermediation activities will be profitable. An additional issue arises here whether the intermediary wishes to operate as a pure market maker. Our result shows that it depends on parameter values. If λ b β ≤ 1 2 then the buyers' outside option value is low. In this case, the middleman sector generates good enough profits for the market-making middleman mode to be adopted for any value of Proof. See the Appendix.
Extensions
This section considers two extensions of the model. As will be shown, our main insight that the profit of using a platform as part or all of the intermediation business is relatively large when agents can search multi markets, rather than single market, is robust to these extensions. 
Non-linear matching function
So far, we assumed the linear matching function in the D market, which leads to a constant
for sellers. In this section, we extend it to a more general matching function. As is standard in the literature we assume that the matching function is homogeneous of degree one in
, where
S D is the buyer-seller ratio in the D market. Then, we allow for the dependence of the individual match probabilities on the population ratio,
is strictly concave and decreasing in x D .
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With single-market search technologies, the result will not be affected by this extension. Therefore, we only consider multi-market search technologies. As mentioned before, we shall let agents exit if they have traded successfully in the C market. 11 Then, the population in the D market is given by
With this modification, the buyers' probability to meet an available seller changes from
, and the sellers' probability to meet an available buyer changes from λ s ξ(x m , K) to
In what follows, we derive a necessary condition for a pure middleman mode to be selected under multi-market search technologies. This is the case when, for example,
when there is no feedback from the D-market to the intermediary's decision in the C market. We proceed with the following steps. First, note that, as before, there is no gain of having an excess capacity K > x m . In addition, a pure middleman wants to avoid stockouts
for any x D = B−K S ≥ 0, which states that the elasticity of the middleman's price
This condition guarantees that a pure middleman should satisfy all the forthcoming demand
Second, when all buyers are served by the middleman x m = K = B, the marginal gain of allocating buyers to the platform, measured by the intermediation fee,
can not exceed the marginal opportunity cost, measured by the lost revenue in the middleman sector,
Hence, the intermediary can be a pure middleman even with multiple-market search technologies.
Proposition 3 With a non-linear matching function in the D market outlined above, a pure middleman mode can be profitable even with multi-market search technologies only if the middleman's price is inelastic at the full capacity x m = K = B. Otherwise, the intermediary should be a marketmaking middleman or a pure market maker.
Proof. See the Appendix. The following figure shows the optimal structure in terms of x /B in the space of B and β. When this number is one, it is pure middleman; when it is zero, it is pure marketmaker. As you can see, the higher β, the more platform in the intermediary, due to the buyers' outside option effect. In general, the larger B, the more platform is. But a higher B does not necessarily lead to a pure middleman.
The elasticities at the optimal structure I computed several elasticities and derivatives. They are Derivative of λ β w.r.t x :
The contour lines represent the value of price elasticity with respect to K. It clearly shows when such price elasticity is smaller than 1, then pure middleman is optimal, and when it is higher than 1, then active platform is optimal. However, still we can't identify which area exactly maps into the pure marketmaker mode. 
Endowment economy
In our baseline model, we simplify the middleman's inventory stocking by assuming that sellers have unlimited production capability and there are no frictions in the trade between the middleman and sellers. In this section, we study this issue in an endowment economy. Suppose that each seller owns one unit of endowment. In total, a mass of S commodities are available. In the wholesale market, the middleman can access a fraction α of sellers, where we assume that α ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous parameter. Then, the middleman's inventory should satisfy the aggregate resource 12 The figures is drawn with S = 1 and
In a world with unlimited production capacity, sellers are willing to supply as long as the wholesale price, denoted as p w , is enough to compensate for the marginal cost; whereas in an endowment economy, sellers are only willing to supply if p w is high enough to compensate for trading opportunities they lose in other channels. Once contacted by the middleman, sellers choose among selling the endowment to the middleman, or joining the C market platform and/or joining the D market. To simplify the analysis, we abstract away the influence of what sellers can expect from the D market on the determination of wholesale price, and assume that sellers in the D market receive zero trade share,
Our main conclusion does not depend on this simplification. Then, the middleman's offer to buy from sellers is accepted if and only if
where W (x s ) is the expected value of sellers to operate in the C market platform. As expected, the solution is characterized by the binding resource constraint (17) and an active platform x s > 0 when B > αS. Note that the intermediary could deactivate the platform since it would lead to the lowest wholesale price of middleman p w = 0. However, it turns out that the benefit of fee revenue from the active platform outweighs the cost savings in the middleman sector. Hence, even with single-market technologies, the aggregate resource constraint can be one reason for the intermediary to open the platform sector in the endowment economy.
Proposition 4 Consider the endowment economy outlined above with single-market search technology, and the zero trade share of sellers in the D market. The intermediation chooses to be:
• a pure middleman if B ≤ αS;
• a market-making middleman with K = αS ≤ x m if B > αS.
The result x m ≥ K occurs because, in line with the previous setup, an excess inventory means extra costs in the middleman sector and lost revenues in the platform. Figure 3 demonstrates that when B > αS, it is possible that the intermediary attracts an excessive number of buyers to the middleman sector x m > K, resulting in stockouts, in order to lower the wholesale price in the middleman sector. 13 When this occurs, the resource constraint is tight and the outside value of agents is high so that economizing on stocking costs is relatively important.
Multi-market search: With multi-market search technologies, the participation constraint of agents is not the issue but the intermediation fee and the middleman's price should be acceptable relative to the outside value. Hence, the intermediary faces the incentive constraints, (4) - (6) with an appropriate modification of the match probability in the D market (see the details in the proof of Proposition 5). As before, these conditions are reduced to f ≤ v(x m , K).
To be consistent, we shall maintain the assumption of zero trade share of sellers β = 1 in the D market. This assumption now implies that sellers are fully exploited in the C market, thus
With the multi-market search setup, the buyers' outside option value depends negatively on the number of sellers available in the D market. This appears to have the following consequences. First, just like in the baseline setup, a pure middleman mode can never be profit maximizing.
Second, in our endowment economy, the intermediary may wish to stock more inventories than the number of buyers visiting the middleman sector. This is because a larger K will crowd out the supply available in the D market, which will eventually lower the outside value of buyers and increase the profit. Therefore, unlike in all the previous setups, the solution here allows for an excess inventory in the middleman sector. Comparing Proposition 4 and 5, we summarize the implication of the search frictions in wholesale markets represented by α and the agents' search technologies in retail markets on the determination of intermediation mode in our endowment economy.
• For αS ≥ B, the middleman can stock the full inventory that satisfies all the buyers' demand. As in the benchmark setup, the intermediary chooses to be a pure middleman with singlemarket search, but uses an active platform with multi-market search. Unlike in the previous setups, the middleman holds an excessive amount of inventory.
• For αS < B, the full inventory is not possible due to the aggregate resource constraint.
The intermediary uses a platform irrespective of whether agents search single or multiple markets. Our main insight is still valid. Namely, the intermediation mode is further away from the pure middleman when agents search multiple, rather than single, markets: the size of middleman sector, measured by x m , is smaller with multi-market search than with single-market search technologies.
Applications
Our analysis shows that a marketmaking middleman can outperform either extreme intermediation mode in two respects. Relative to a pure market-maker, its inventory holdings can reduce the out-of-stock risk, while relative to a pure middleman its platform can enlarge the surplus of intermediated trade and the profitability of middleman's selling capacities. In this section, we offer real markets examples to see how this simple intuition is practiced. Specialist Markets The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is considered as a specialist market, which is defined as a hybrid market that includes an auction component (e.g., a floor auction or a limit order book) together with one or more specialists (also called designated market makers).
Online Retailers
The specialists have some responsibility for the market: as brokers, they pair executable customer orders against each other; and as dealers, they post quotes with reasonable depth (Conroy and Winkler, 1986 ).
As for their role as dealers in the exchanges, our model suggests that at least for less active securities (represented by smaller outside option values in the model), the specialists' market 14 Nowadays, most buyers and sellers use Amazon as the main website (the first one to visit). On the seller side, according to a survey on Amazon sellers conducted in 2016, more than three-quarters of participants sell through multiple channels, online marketplaces, webstores and bricks-and-mortar stores. The second most popular channel, after Amazon, is eBay, with 73% selling through this marketplace. On the buyer side, according to a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll, 51 percent of consumers plan to do most of their shopping on the Amazon.com.
can provide predictable immediacy and increase the trading volume and liquidity. In real-life markets, this result features the following trading patterns observed in many financial markets.
First, "large/mid cap" securities are mostly traded on the platform, while the trade of "small cap" securities is usually supported by middlemen. Second, there is a trend over the past two decades to adopt hybrid markets in derivatives exchanges and stock markets around the world, especially for thinly-traded securities. For example, several European stock exchanges implemented a program which gives less active stocks an option of accompanying a designated dealer in the auction market. alternative trading systems, and more than 250 broker-dealers in the U.S. (Tuttle, 2014) . As a more specific implication, we show that the increased pressure from outside markets will scale up the platform component. This is indeed the case. Starting from 2006, the NYSE adopted the new hybrid trading system featuring an expanded platform sector "NYSE Arca", which allows investors to choose whether to trade electronically or by using traditional floor brokers and specialists. The new system is further supplemented by several dark pools, akin to platforms, owned by the NYSE.
In addition, the use of fees is widely adopted, as is consistent with our theory. For instance, in 2014, the NYSE offered banks a discount of trading costs by more than 80% conditional on their agreement to be away from the outside dark pools and other off-exchange venues.
15
Real estate agencies As mentioned in the Introduction, while intermediaries in housing markets are mostly thought of as brokers, i.e. platforms, the business mode employed by the Trump family is a marketmaking middleman. Another example is Thor Equities, a large-scaled real estate company, which owns and redevelops retail properties in Soho, Madison Avenue, and Fifth Avenue, and also runs brokerage agencies, Thor Retail Advisors and Town Residential.
In the endowment economy version of our model, we show that the marketmaking middleman over-invests in inventory with multi-market search, up to the point where the resource constraint is binding. Perhaps, the real estate market in New York City (NYC) is an appropriate example of this since it is well known to be competitive and tight for house/apartment hunters. In addition, most new developments in big cities are renovations of old houses, and so we can roughly regard the total supply as fixed.
Notably, top real estate firms in NYC attempt to expand their business by being engaged in many new joint projects with developers. Mapped into our model, these efforts are aimed at relaxing their resource constraint and increasing their inventory.
For example, Nest Seekers, a real estate brokerage and marketing firm in NYC, works tightly with constructors on new developments. They work together from the very early stage of layout design and fund raising (in some cases Nest Seekers offers their own capital) to the later marketing stage. Nest Seekers provides qualified sales and administrative staff to the sales office, prepares pricing schedules, manages all contracts with the brokerage community, and is eventually in change of the entire marketing process. This co-development business is one step beyond the middleman mode formulated in our theory, but is considered as an alternative way to secure their inventory.
16
This business mode is adopted in many other big real-estate companies in NYC, such as Douglas Elliman, Stribling, and Corcoran.
A final note is that some intermediaries not only help market new developments, but also manage apartment complex, which constitutes another source of "inventory". For example, Brown
Harris Stevens provides the residential management service for it since cooperative apartments were first introduced to NYC. These cooperative apartments usually contain hundred of units in one building, and Brown Harris Stevens is then in charge of listing these properties when they are for rent or on sale.
16 Strictly speaking, Nest Seekers does not own properties, but becomes the exclusive agent of projects. So far, they have co-developed/marketed more than 30 projects. See https://www.nestseekers.com/NewDevelopments. A report titled "Inside the fight for Manhattans most valuable new development exclusives" by The Real Deal introduces more detailed information on how brokers cooperate with developers, which is available in http://therealdeal.com/2016/03/15/inside-the-fight-for-manhattans-most-valuable-new-developmentexclusives/ (visited on July 15, 2016).
Conclusion
This paper developed a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. We considered two representative business modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets, a market-making mode and a middleman mode. We showed that the mixture of the two modes, a marketmaking middleman, can emerge. The marketmaking middleman can outperform either extreme intermediation mode in two respects. Relative to a pure market-maker, its inventory holdings can reduce the out-of-stock risk, while relative to a pure middleman its platform can enlarge the surplus of intermediated trade and the profitability of middleman's selling capacities.
For future research, it would be interesting to examine whether competition among intermediaries, rather than outside option, can shape the emergence of market-making middlemen. We believe that the model can be also extended to analyze the market-making behaviors of intermediaries in dynamic financial markets settings.
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Appendix
Proof for Lemma 1
in the neighbourhood of K = B. Hence, there exists some K < B such that v(K, K) > v(B, B). This completed the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof for Lemma 2
Using K ≤ x m and (15), the intermediary's problem can be written as max
subject to (13) and
Observe that: limxm→B Π (
)f is the profit of pure market-maker mode (14) . Hence, we can compactify the constraint set and set up a general problem to pin down a profit-maximizing intermediation mode using the following Lagrangian:
where the µ's ≥ 0 are the lagrange multiplier of each constraint. In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that the following first order conditions are necessary and sufficient:
The solution is characterized by these and the complementary slackness conditions of the four constraints. We now prove the claims in the lemma. First, (20) implies that we must have
which implies the binding constraint (13),
Second, applying µv from (20) into (21) gives
which implies that K = x m . This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof for Proposition 2
Active platform. First of all, we show that the platform will always be active (i.e., x m < B) in equilibrium. Substituting µ k , µv into (19),
Suppose that the solution is x m = B. Then, (22) 
This implies that the allocation of middleman sector x m ∈ (0, B) is unique (if it exists), and that if
and the solution must be a pure market maker, x m = 0. Now, we need to investigate the sign of it:
. Observe that:
and
This derivative has the following properties:
There are two cases.
•
, we have ∂Θ(x) ∂x |x=0≥ 0 and
, we have
|x=0< 0. Hence, there exists at least onex ∈ (0, ∞) such that Θ(x) < 0 for x <x and Θ(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥x. Below we show that such a value has to be unique. For this purpose, observe that:
These properties imply that there exists an x ∈ (0, ∞) such that Υ(x) < for all x < x and Υ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ x . This further implies that the critical value defined abovex is unique.
To summarize, we have shown that if
then the solution is a market-making middleman
then there exists a unique critical valuex ∈ (0, ∞) such that the solution is a market-making middleman for x ≥x and is a pure market-maker x m = 0 for x <x.
Second order condition. Finally, we verify the second order condition. Define X ≡ [x m , f, K] and write the binding constraints as
The solution characterized above is a maximum if the Hessian of L with respect to X at the solution denoted by (X * , µ * ) is negative definite on the constraint set {w : Dh (X * ) w = 0} with h ≡ [h1(X), h2(X)].
This can be verified by using the bordered Hessian matrix, denoted as H.
The determinant is given by |H| = −
(1 − c) < 0. Thus, the sufficient condition is satisfied. This completed the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 1
In (22), we have: 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof takes the steps very similar to the ones shown in the proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.
With the non-linear matching function, the intermediary's profit function is modified to
, and the surplus function to
With these profit and surplus functions, the constraints and the Lagrangian remain unchanged, and the first orders are given by (19) - (21) (see below the second order conditions). As before, (20) implies that we must have
and the binding constraint (13) . Further, applying µv from (20) into (21) gives
Substituting µ k , µv into (19),
Suppose now that x m = B and K > 0. Then, µ k > 0 in (23) if and only if
and µ b ≥ 0 in (24) if and only if
. Both of these conditions are satisfied only when K = B (which implies x D = 0, satisfying the latter condition) and Finally, we verify the second order condition. With the modified profit and surplus functions, as before, the bordered Hessian matrix is computed as
The determinant is |H| = −
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
As stated in the main text, for αS ≥ B the intermediary can achieve the highest possible profit by choosing to be a pure middleman. What remains here is to prove the proposition for αS < B. Applying the analysis in the previous section, we get the value of sellers, W (x
The binding participation constraint for buyers implies that p m = 1 − 
This also guarantees
) > 0 and non negative profits. Using all these expressions of prices and fee, we can write the profit function as
which is positive if min{K, x m } = x m . Hence, the solution has to satisfy x m ≥ K. ) is the profit of pure market-maker mode.
Hence, as before, we can find a profit-maximizing intermediation mode using the following Lagrangian:
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The first order conditions are
Suppose x m = B. Then, we must have µ k = 0 (since B > αS ≥ K) and so (27) implies we also must have
Hence, the solution must satisfy x m < B (and µ b = 0), i.e., an active platform.
Summing up the two first order conditions with µ b = 0,
where the last inequality follows from (27) and µ b = 0 that implies
This implies µs > 0, i.e., the binding resource constraint (17) , which implies K = αS. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
In our endowment economy, the middleman's inventory purchase influences the market tightness not only in the C market platform, but also in the D market. Given all sellers are in the D market, the probability that a buyer meets a seller available for trade in the D market changes from λ Hence, the solution has to be x m < B, i.e., an active platform.
We set the Lagrangian, L = Π(x m , K) + µ0x m + µ k (K − x m ) + µs(αS − K).
Proposition 6
With unobservable capacity and with participation fees, the intermediary sets f > 1, p m = 1 and K = B. All the buyers buy from the middleman, x m = B, and the platform is inactive, Multi-market search: With multiple-market search, any non-positive registration fee can ensure that agents are in the C market, since the participation to the C market is not exclusive. Hence, attracting one side of the market becomes less costly. By contrast, conquering the other side becomes more costly, since the conquered side still holds the trading opportunity in the D market. The DsC b condition with multiple-market search is Ds : − g s ≥ 0,
The divide-condition Ds tells that now a non-positive fee is sufficient to convince one side to participate. The conquer-condition C b now needs to compensate for the outside option in the D market. Similarly, the D b Cs condition becomes
